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Based on the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) of firms in 
transition countries, which unbundles corruption to measure different types of corrupt 
transactions and provide detailed information on the characteristics and performance of firms, 
we find that:  i) corruption reduces FDI inflows and attracts lower quality investment in terms of 
governance standards; ii) in misgoverned settings, FDI firms may magnify the problems of state 
capture and procurement kickbacks, while paying a lower overall bribe burden than domestic 
firms; iii) FDI firms undertake those forms of corruption that suit their comparative advantages, 
generating substantial gains for them and challenging the premise that they are coerced, which 
makes it difficult to develop effective constraints on such behavior; and, iv) transnational legal 
restrictions to prevent bribery had not led to higher standards of corporate conduct among 
foreign investors by the year 2000.    Rather than being construed as a case against foreign 
investment; we argue that state capture is created and maintained through restrictions on 
competition and entry in strategic sectors. Thus, enhancing competition by attracting a wider, 
more diverse set of FDI firms is critical to the broader strategic framework of fighting state 
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“Thou hast it now: King, Cawdor, Glamis, all…and I fear, thou play’dst most foully for’t”  




It is now widely accepted that corruption poses substantial costs for economic development. 
There is strong empirical evidence that higher levels of corruption are associated with lower 
growth and lower per capita income across the globe. One of the channels through which 
corruption hinders growth is its impact on foreign direct investment (FDI). A number of recent 
studies have shown that corruption inhibits FDI.
1 Nowhere does this seem more relevant than 
in the meager flows of FDI to the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. More than a decade since the collapse of communism across the region, the hopes that 
the creation of market economies would attract substantial flows of FDI have not materialized, 
especially in the Balkans and the former Soviet countries. It is common to lay the blame on poor 
standards of governance and in particular high levels of corruption in the region.
2 But though 
most of the focus has been on the extent of foreign investors who have stayed away from the 
transition countries, comparatively little attention has been given to the behavior of those who 
have invested in these countries. Do foreign investors in transition countries import better 
standards of corporate conduct and governance or do they contribute to the problem? A recent 
wave of no bribery pledges, ethics codes, enhanced compliance procedures and transnational 
legal restrictions have been targeted to encourage foreign investors to meet higher standards of 
governance than those of the local environment. Yet we have no systematic evidence on how 
foreign investors behave when they are far from home. 
 
Most existing studies of corruption and FDI are based on indices of corruption perceptions at 
the country level and bilateral aggregate investment flows. There has also been a considerable 
collection of anecdotal evidence and case studies on the practices of foreign investors.
3 But to 
assess the behavioral standards of foreign firms that actually invest in transition economies, we 
need firm-level data that would allow comparisons of the propensity to engage in corruption of 
both foreign firms and domestic firms. The recent Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS), a comprehensive survey of over 4000 firms in 22 transition 
countries, provides such data.
4 The BEEPS data unbundles the concept of corruption to 
distinguish and measure different types of corrupt transactions, as well as providing detailed 
information on the characteristics and performance of firms. This allows us to develop a detailed 
and nuanced picture of the types of corruption that different sorts of firms engage in and the 
impact of such corruption on firm performance. 
                                                 
1 See Abed and Davoodi (2000), Alesina and Weder (1999), Smarzynska and Wei (2000) and Wei (1997). 
2 Recent measures of corruption place the region among the most corrupt in the world.  For measures of 
corruption and a discussion of the problems inherent in making such cross-country comparisons, see Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).  The World Bank (2000) report: Anti-Corruption in Transition presents 
regional comparisons of the level of corruption based on Kaufmann et al (1999). Section 5 discusses the link 
between corruption and aggregate FDI flows. 
3 Examples abound.  Political economy analyses of FDI:  Box 4.1 Moran  – political economy of 
protectionism…IBM in Mexico, Fiat in Poland, Suzuki in Hungary – we provide a statistical evaluation to 
complement what is usually case-study evidence. The Bribe-Payers’ Index of Transparency International also 
represents an important effort to understand the propensity for foreign firms to pay bribes, though it is based not 
on surveys of firms and their practices, but on the perceptions of firms in the domestic markets. See: 
http://www.transparency.org.  
4 This survey was financed by the EBRD and the World Bank Institute. A description of this survey is given in 
Appendix 1. Details on the survey and its methodological approach to measuring governance can be found in 
Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann and Schankerman (2000). - 4 - 
 
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows: 
 
§ While corruption reduces the quantity of FDI flows into the transition economies, it also 
appears on  average to attract lower quality investors with regard to some important 
governance standards. In particular, in countries where the state is highly susceptible to 
capture by economic vested interests, FDI firms are significantly more likely than their 
domestic counterparts to engage in corrupt forms of political influence, a phenomenon that 
we have referred to as state capture. (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000; Hellman and 
Kaufmann 2001) 
 
§ By contrast, in countries that have avoided the trap of significant state capture by vested 
interests, FDI firms are significantly less likely than their domestic counterparts to engage in 
corrupt forms of political influence 
 
§ Different types of foreign investors engage in particular types of corruption tailored to their 
comparative advantages. FDI firms with local partners are more likely to engage in state 
capture.  Larger multinational firms with headquarters overseas rely much less on state 
capture, yet are much more likely to resort to kickbacks in their dealings with foreign states.  
 
§ Though often foreign investors might claim that they are specifically targeted for bribes by 
“grabbing hand” governments
5, we find no evidence that FDI firms pay higher overall bribes 
than their domestic counterparts, even though they are more likely to engage in specific 
forms of corruption. In addition, the direct performance gains to foreign investors from 
these forms of corruption are shown to be considerable, strengthening the view that FDI 
firms enjoy a substantial share of the rents from corruption. The evidence therefore does not 
support the view of coercion of foreign investors to pay bribes. 
 
§ On the basis of this survey evidence collected in 1999-2000, transnational legal restrictions to 
prevent bribery, such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the much more recent 
OECD Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, have not led to higher standards 
of corporate conduct among foreign investors bound by their provisions, though the OECD 
Convention is still in the very early stages of implementation.  
 
Data and Concepts 
 
The data set on which this research is based is the 1999-2000 Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). The BEEPS survey was designed to assess the quality 
of the  business environment, including governance and corruption
6 on the basis of the 
experiences and practices of firms. The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews 
with firm managers or owners in site visits during the period June through August 1999 in the 22 
                                                 
5 For the notion of government as a grabbing hand, see Shleifer and Vishny (1998). 
6 As many of the forms of corruption examined in the survey are illegal in most countries, firms must be 
expected to be reluctant to admit that they engage in such activity. In implementing the survey, the problems 
associated with collecting reliable data were kept constantly in mind, and every effort was made to assure 
respondents that their answers would be treated confidentially.  Questions were phrased indirectly about the 
corruption faced by “firms in your line of business” and respondents were assured that responses would be 
aggregated and not attributable to themselves or their firms. The survey questions examine corruption from a 
number of different angles providing consistency checks on each firm’s responses.  Moreover, tests w ere 
conducted to detect any systematic positive or negative bias among the firms in any given country. - 5 - 
transition countries.
7 In each country, between 125 and 150 firms were interviewed with the 
exception of three countries where larger samples were used: Poland (246), Russia (552) and 
Ukraine (247). The sample was structured to be representative of the domestic economies with 
specific quotas placed on size, sector, location, and export orientation. The sample was heavily 
weighted towards privately owned firms, though there were quotas for state-owned firms.  
 
The sample also included a significant number of firms with foreign direct investment, defined 
as any firm in which a foreign-registered firm has an ownership stake. The survey also enables us 
to identify the percentage of capital owned by the foreign firm to determine whether the firm is 
majority foreign-owned. We can also distinguish between FDI firms with headquarters overseas 
that are generally establishments of multinational firms and FDI firms with local headquarters 
that are more likely to be joint ventures with local partners. This will enable us to examine 
whether different types of FDI firms maintain different standards of governance within the 
transition countries. 
 
Table 1 presents a cross-country summary of the sample composition of the BEEPS in terms of 





                                                 
7 The countries included: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian 
Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
Table 1 – Domestic and Foreign Firms in the BEEPS Sample 
















Albania  160  139  21  71.6  12  9 
Armenia  125  123  2  85.0  0  2 
Azerbaijan  137  124  13  80.1  12  1 
Belarus  132  117  15  47.7  14  1 
Bulgaria  130  113  17  56.1  17  0 
Croatia  127  110  17  46.1  17  0 
Czech Republic  149  116  33  83.5  24  9 
Estonia  132  106  26  54.7  23  3 
Georgia  129  111  18  50.5  15  3 
Hungary  146  119  27  78.2  26  1 
Kazakhstan  147  120  27  82.9  11  16 
Kyrgyzstan  132  117  15  36.3  14  1 
Latvia  166  125  41  63.5  40  1 
Lithuania  112  106  6  51.3  6  0 
Moldova  138  122  16  66.9  14  2 
Poland  245  205  40  56.0  37  3 
Romania  125  105  20  56.9  19  1 
Russia  552  515  37  54.6  31  6 
Slovak Republic  137  122  15  52.9  13  2 
Slovenia  125  108  17  66.9  17  0 
Ukraine  247  217  30  45.3  28  2 
Uzbekistan  126  108  18  49.3  17  1 
             
Overall  3619  3148  471  60.9  407  64 - 6 - 
Unbundling and measuring corruption in the transition economies
8 
Most existing studies of the link between corruption and FDI use country-level measures of 
corruption based primarily on the perceptions of external actors. We rely on firm-level data that 
measures the experience of firms engaging in corrupt practices. Moreover, the BEEPS survey 
was designed to unbundle the concept of corruption to identify distinct types of corrupt 
transactions that we have shown elsewhere to have distinct causes and consequences (Hellman, 
Jones and Kaufmann 2000). Consequently, we can compare both the extent and t ype of 
corruption experienced by foreign versus domestic firms, as well as among different types of 
foreign firms.  
 
We focus on two forms of corruption: 
 
•  State capture: defined as the extent to which firms make illicit private payments to public 
officials in order to influence the formation of laws, rules, regulations or decrees by state 
institutions, and 
•  Public procurement kickbacks:
9 defined as illicit private payments to public officials to secure 
public procurement contracts. 
 
We would distinguish these forms of corruption from what international legislation refers to as 
facilitation payments, which are  private payments to public officials in order to facilitate 
implementation of administrative regulations placed by the state on the firm’s activities. 
Facilitation payments are generally not covered by international anti-bribery conventions. More 
importantly, facilitation payments are more likely to be extracted from firms by the “grabbing 
hand” of the state 
10 with the resulting rents predominantly going to bureaucrats that have the 
power and discretion to intervene in the market. State capture and public procurement kickbacks 
are more likely to be initiated by firms to gain advantages in legislative and procurement 
decisions. They tend to be tools of influence rather than forms of predation with the resulting 
rents shared by both firms and bureaucrats.
  11,12 Focusing on state capture and procurement 
kickbacks allows us to disentangle the various forms of corruption experienced by firms and 
examine those forms that might provide better insights into the firm’s incentives and behavior. 
 
The BEEPS survey provides the first empirical measures of state capture. Firms were asked to 
disaggregate the types of bribery in which “firms like yours” have been engaged. Those that 
report having made private payments to public officials for the purpose of influencing the 
content of laws, decrees or regulations are designated as captor firms. Similarly, firms were asked if 
                                                 
8 This section draws heavily on Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) where a fuller discussion can be found 
not only of the measurement of corruption, but also firm level mechanisms underlying these aggregate indices. 
9 Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) made the tripartite distinction between administrative corruption, state 
capture and influence, defined as the extent to which firms have influence on the formation of laws, rules, 
regulations and decrees by state institutions without recourse to illicit and non-transparent private payments to 
public officials. Influence was found to be related to the origins of the firm and the legacy of its ties to the state 
through previous or continuing state ownership.  In this paper the focus is on the narrower phenomenon of 
corruption and we do not examine the propensity of international investors to exercise influence. Instead we 
introduce public procurement corruption as a specific form of corruption that is frequently anecdotally 
associated with foreign firms and does not fit easily into the two-way classification of corrupt transactions into 
state capture and administrative corruption. 
10 The “grabbing hand” model of government was proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1993). 
11 Such a view might be termed the “shaking hands” model of government. 
12 See World Bank (2000) for a detailed analysis of corruption in the transition economies based on the two 
dimensional classification by administrative corruption and state capture. - 7 - 
they had made private payments to public officials to obtain public procurement contracts, 
though this question was only asked of the subset of firms that already identified themselves as 
having trade with the state. Thus, a group of kickback firms can be identified from the larger 
sample. Table 2 presents the data on the share of captor firms and kickback firms in each 
country. 
 
In addition, Table 2 provides a measure of the average share of bribe payments by firms as a 
share of their annual revenue.
13 This is an indicator of the extent of total bribe payments for all 
forms of corruption, including facilitation payments, by the firm in each country. The data in 
Table 2 allow us to examine both the types of corruption engaged in by firms and the extent of 
corruption payments. 
                                                 
13 The question was posed in terms of firm revenues rather that profits since estimates of revenues are more 
reliable. In addition the question was posed indirectly in terms of "firms like yours" to reassure respondents that 
their responses would not be attributable directly to their firm. We take total payments as a proxy for 
administrative corruption since evidence from the BEEPS suggests that the majority of bribe payments are for 
this purpose. 
Table 2 – Measuring the Types and Level of Corruption in Transition Economies 
Country  Share of Captor 
Firms2 
Share of Kickback 
Firms3 
Average Share of Annual Firm 
Revenues Paid in Bribes1 
Albania  11  51  4.0 
Armenia  7  26  4.6 
Azerbaijan  24  52  5.7 
Belarus  2  5  1.3 
Bulgaria  11  13  2.1 
Croatia  10  26  1.1 
Czech Republic  7  43  2.5 
Estonia  5  28  1.6 
Georgia  8  18  4.3 
Hungary  4  15  1.7 
Kazakhstan  6  21  3.1 
Kyrgyzstan  7  19  5.3 
Latvia  14  22  1.4 
Lithuania  14  15  2.8 
Moldova  12  9  4.0 
Poland  9  32  1.6 
Romania  13  39  3.2 
Russia  9  22  2.8 
Slovakia  12  35  2.5 
Slovenia  10  27  1.4 
Ukraine  12  33  4.4 
Uzbekistan  2  24  4.4 
       
Overall  9.5  26  3.0 
Source: Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) based on BEEPS. 
 
Notes: 
1 – Firms were asked: What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments to public officials? 
The responses ranged across 0%; less than 1%; 1 to 2%; 2-10%; 10 to 12%; 12 to 25%; over 25%. The variable was interpolated at 
0%, 1%, 2%, 6%, 11%, 19% and 25%. 
2 - Firms were asked whether state capture in each of the following dimensions (parliamentary legislation, presidential decrees, 
central bank, criminal courts, commercial courts, political parties) had no impact; minor impact; significant impact or very 
significant impact on their business. Those firms that reported a significant or very significant impact were classified as affected by 
state capture in that dimension. The state capture index is calculated at the unweighted average of the proportion of firms in each 
country affected by each of the six components of state capture. 
3 – Those firms that traded with the government were asked: how often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra unofficial 
payments to public officials gain government contracts? The responses ranged across always; usually; frequently; sometimes; 
seldom and never. Those responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as kickback firms. - 8 - 
 
FDI flows to the transition economies 
 
The existing literature on corruption and FDI has focused on whether the volume of FDI is 
affected by the level of corruption in the host country. Wei (1997) finds a negative relationship 
between corruption and FDI in a data set of bilateral aggregate investment flows. Alesina and 
Weder (1999) find that aggregate FDI flows are negatively related to corruption, although not 
very strongly. Smarzynska and Wei (2000) find again, although this time with firm-level data, that 
corruption is negatively related to FDI. Regarding the transition economies, there is no recent 
survey of the determinants of FDI flows. The only related paper is Abed and Davoodi (2000) 
who find that corruption is negatively related to FDI flows to the transition economies, but that 
structural reforms are more important as a determinant of FDI.
14 
 
Table 3 presents cross-country measures of cumulative net FDI flows to the transition 
economies since the onset of transition in absolute and per capita terms. Though FDI flows to 
the region overall have been relatively small, there is considerable diversity across the region in 
particular between the countries of the CIS and the rest of the region. Most CIS countries have 
received little FDI (with the exception of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
15 which have received 
more significant amounts of oil-related investment). In contrast, the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Baltics have received much higher levels of inward investment.  
                                                 
14 The authors proceed to argue that corruption is caused by a lack of progress in structural reforms. However these results 
are hampered by a failure to recognize that corruption in the form of state capture can be a cause of the lack of progress in 
structural reform. This political economy dynamic is analyzed in Hellman et al (2000). 
15 The theory that corruption regimes may actually be favored by foreign investors is illustrated by the case of Kazakhstan. 
Several US oil companies are currently under investigation for paying kickbacks to the Kazak government. (Economist 24
th 
July). - 9 - 
Table 3 – Recent and Cumulative FDI flows to the Transition Economies 
Cumulative FDI inflows  Recent FDI inflows 
  (Million US$)  (US$ per capita)  (US$ per capita)  (% of GDP) 
   1989-2000  1989-2000*  1999  2000  1999  2000 
             
Albania  597  176  15  42  1.4  3.5 
Bulgaria  307  71  21  27  2.1  2.8 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  3,307  407  98  120  6.5  8.1 
Croatia  4,085  907  304  167  6.8  3.9 
Czech Republic  21,673  2,102  605  434  11.7  9.1 
Estonia  1,926  1,337  154  168  4.3  4.9 
FR Yugoslavia  1,015  118  13  6  1.1  0.5 
FYR Macedonia  437  219  14  85  0.8  5.0 
Hungary  18,926  1,885  140  115  2.9  2.5 
Latvia  2,499  1,056  139  169  5.0  5.6 
Lithuania  2,387  648  129  102  4.5  3.3 
Poland   29,052  751  164  240  4.1  5.9 
Romania  6,768  303  48  45  3.1  2.8 
Slovak Republic  3,611  669  130  278  3.6  7.4 
Slovenia  1,534  768  72  67  0.7  0.7 
             
Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic 
States  98,124  772  136  138  3.9  4.4 
             
Armenia  605  159  34  39  7.1  7.8 
Azerbaijan  4,092  502  64  61  12.8  12.1 
Belarus  776  78  22  9  1.9  1.0 
Georgia  687  128  11  19  2.2  3.4 
Kazakhstan  8,499  571  106  77  9.4  6.3 
Kyrgyzstan  458  97  9  9  3.6  3.1 
Moldova  438  102  8  23  2.6  7.1 
Russia  9,998  69  5  -2  0.4  -0.1 
Tajikistan  144  23  3  4  1.9  2.2 
Turkmenistan  882  165  18  19  4.8  4.5 
Ukraine  3,345  67  10  12  1.6  1.9 
Uzbekistan  697  28  5  3  1.5  1.2 
             
Commonwealth of 
Independent States   30,621  166  25  23  4.1  4.2 
             
Total   128,745  504  88  88  4.1  4.4 
Sources: IMF; Central Banks and EBRD. 
Notes: FDI is measured as the net inflow recorded in the balance of payments. For most countries, figures 
cover only investment in equity capital and in some cases contributions-in-kind.  For those countries (e.g. 
Estonia, Slovak Republic) where net investment into equity capital was not easily available, more recent data 
include reinvested earnings as well as inter-company debt transactions. Gross inflows of FDI are in some cases 
considerably higher than net inflows on account of increasing intra-regional investment flows. 
*Population for the cumulative per capita FDI flow is measured as at 2000. 
 
Table 4 examines the links between these FDI flows and the country-level aggregate measures of 
corruption from the BEEPS survey. There are many difficulties associated with attempting to 
understand the decisions of foreign investors with a simple cross-section of aggregate data. As a 
consequence, the results are intended to be merely suggestive and corroborative of the more 
systematic studies discussed above. The table contains OLS regressions in which the dependent 
variable is a measure of FDI flows. We present results based on two measures of FDI flows - - 10 - 
cumulative FDI flows 1989-99 and 1989-2000. It is important to highlight that the FDI variables 
reflect net flows. However, to the extent that corruption also induces capital to leave the country, 
as well as deterring the inflow of foreign capital, this is a useful measure of the link between FDI 
and corruption. We include separately the three indices of corruption -- state capture, public 
procurement kickbacks, and the overall share of bribes in annual revenues. In addition a measure 
of natural resource abundance is included,
16 since this is an important factor in attracting FDI. 
Finally we include a dummy for those countries that could be considered to operate substantially 
unreformed communist systems,
17 since this factor potentially overwhelms determinants as an 
explanation for FDI flows to these countries.  
 
With the above caveats in mind, we find a consistent pattern across the specifications. The share 
of revenues paid in bribes is negatively related to FDI flows however they are measured. State 
capture also emerges as negatively related to FDI flows. Surprisingly p ublic procurement 
corruption is unrelated to FDI flows, although this possibly reflects the fact that not all foreign 
investors are engage in businesses that require winning public contracts. Finally, we find that 
after controlling for corruption, natural resources are insignificant as an explanation of FDI 
flows, and likewise in many cases, perhaps surprisingly, the unreformed communist dummy. 
 
Table 4 – Corruption and aggregate FDI flows 
  Cumulative FDI flows 1989-1999 (US$ per capita) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Bribe Share      -190.8**      -190.9** 
      (-2.64)      (-2.74) 
State Capture  -15.1      -22.8**     
  (-1.46)      (-2.26)     
Public Procurement 
Kickbacks 
  5.9      2.6   
    (0.63 )      (0.27)   
Natural Resources  -16.4  -205.5  25.5  -22.7  -235.0  -28.3 
  (-0.05)  (-0.62)  (0.09)  (-0.08)  (-0.72)  (-0.10) 
Unreformed Communist        -798.4**  -481.1  -512.3 
        (-2.20)  (-1.20)  (-1.58) 
N  22  22  22  22  22  22 
R2  0.11  0.04  0.28  0.30  0.11  0.37 
  Cumulative FDI flows 1989-2000 (US$ per capita) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Bribe Share      -226.7**      -226.8** 
      (-2.73)      (-2.87) 
State Capture  -16.3      -25.5**     
  (-1.35)      (-2.18)     
Public Procurement 
Kickbacks 
  8.9      5.1   
    (0.84)      (0.46)   
Natural Resources  -69.2  -290.9  -3.7  -76.8  -325.6  -69.8 
  (-0.18)  (-0.77)  (-0.01)  (-0.22)  (-0.87)  (-0.22) 
Unreformed Communist        -948.2  -566.6  -628.1* 
        (-2.25)  (-1.23)  (-1.71) 
N  22  22  22  22  22  22 
R2  0.11  0.05  0.29  0.30  0.13  0.39 
                                                 
16 A dummy variable which takes the value 1 for Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and 0 for the other 
countries. 
17 In this sample, Belarus and Uzbekistan are classified as unreformed communist. See the EBRD (2000) for 
assessments of the progress in economic and institutional reform of the transition economies. - 11 - 
Source: BEEPS’ IMF, Central Banks, EBRD 
**significant at %5; * significant at 10% 
 
Corruption by FDI Firms 
 
With firm-level measures of both the propensity to engage in different types of corruption and 
the level of overall bribe p ayments from BEEPS, we can move beyond the analysis of 
corruption and FDI flows to examine the pattern of corrupt behavior across different types of 
firms. In particular we ask: are firms with FDI more or less likely than domestic firms to engage 
in corruption?  
 
Table 5 presents measures of the extent to which different types of firms are engaged in 
corruption without controlling for other firm characteristics that affect such payments. For each 
form of corruption (state capture, public procurement kickbacks, and total bribe payments) we 
compare the average level of corruption for foreign and domestic firms across all countries in 
the sample. In addition, we divide the sample into two groups of countries, those for which the 
prevalence of that form of corruption is high and those for which it is low 
18, based on the cross-
country measures of each form of corruption.
19  This enables us to examine whether the 
underlying institutional environment, i.e. the extent to which certain forms of corruption have 
become prevalent in the environment, affect the propensity of different types of firms to engage 
in corruption.  
 
 
The results in Table 5 reveal an interesting pattern. In terms of the level of corruption, FDI 
firms and domestic firms pay, on average, a very similar share of their annual revenues in bribes. 
Yet it is in the propensity to engage in different forms of corruption where differences start to 
emerge. FDI firms are somewhat more likely than domestic firms to pay kickbacks for public 
                                                 
18 Relative to the average level in the transition economies. In world-wide terms, none of these countries would 
be considered to have low levels of corruption. 
19 See Appendix 1 for a table of how the sample was divided into low and high groups for each form of 
corruption and for an explanation of the indicators upon which this division was is based. 
Table 5 - The Links Between FDI and Corruption 
  Share of Captor Firms1  Share of Kickback Firms2  Total Bribes Paid 
(as a share of annual revenues)3 
    Countries With:    Countries With:    Countries With: 
























All Firms  9.3  11.4  6.8  25.7  34.2  18.1  3.0  3.8  1.7 
Domestic 
Firms 
9.0  10.4  7.3  25.2  34.0  17.5  3.0  3.8  1.8 
FDI Firms  11.5  18.7  4.0  29.2  36.1  22.4  2.8  4.3  1.4 
Source: BEEPS 
Notes: 
The cross-country measures of corruption presented in table 2 are used to divide the sample into those in which the level of each 
dimension of corruption is high or low. However, to compare the differences between FDI and domestic firms, the behavioral measures 
of actual involvement in each dimension of corruption are used: 
1 – Firms were asked: How often do firms like yours need to make extra unofficial payments to public officials to influence the content of 
new laws, decrees or regulations. The responses ranged across always; usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and never.  Those 
responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as engaging in state capture. 
2 - Those firms that traded with the government were asked: How often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra unofficial 
payments to public officials gain government contracts? The responses ranged across always; usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and 
never. Those responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as engaging in public procurement corruption. 
3  –Firms were asked: What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments to public officials? The 
responses ranged across 0%; less than 1%; 1 to 2%; 2-10%; 10 to 12%; 12 to 25%; over 25%. The variable was interpolated at 0%, 1%, 
2%, 6%, 11%, 19% and 25%. - 12 - 
procurement contracts, though the gap increases in countries where the payment of such 
kickbacks is on average less prevalent. In transition countries where procurement kickbacks are 
common in dealing with the state, both FDI and domestic firms are equally likely to pay them; 
while in countries where kickbacks are less common, FDI firms are more likely to engage in this 
form of corruption.  Though in the case of kickbacks these differences between FDI  and 
domestic firms may not be very substantial, it is interesting to see that despite recent 
developments in ethics codes, compliance procedures and transnational anti-bribery 
conventions, FDI firms do not demonstrate any higher standards of behavior than domestic 
firms. Indeed, nearly a third of all FDI firms surveyed report paying kickbacks to public officials 
when dealing with state procurement contracts. 
 
With respect to state capture, the differences between domestic firms and FDI firms appear 
more pronounced in certain contexts. In countries with a significant state capture problem, FDI 
firms are almost twice as likely as domestic firms to be engaged in efforts to capture the state. 
Where state capture has been more effectively contained, FDI firms are much less likely than 
domestic firms to engage in it. 
 
Although suggestive, these results need to be substantiated with a more thorough econometric 
analysis of the data, in which the variation in other characteristics of the FDI and domestic firms 
that might account for these results can be controlled. Table 6 presents the results of such an 
analysis, controlling for size of the firm, origin of the firm (state-owned, privatized or de novo) 
and country fixed effects.
20  With the inclusion of the control variables, FDI firms are no better 
or worse than domestic firms in their propensity to pay kickbacks. They also show no significant 
difference in the overall levels of bribes paid. Where FDI firms do differ from their domestic 
counterparts is their greater propensity to engage in state capture in countries where the problem 
of state capture is prevalent, as suggested by the interaction between the FDI dummy variable 
and the dummy variable for high capture states.  
 
                                                 
20 We ran alternative specifications of the model with sector dummy variables and replacing the FDI dummy 
variable with a continuous measure of the share of foreign ownership. The results were substantially the same. - 13 - 
 
Foreign investors might respond that the higher level of state capture observed by FDI firms 
results from discriminatory targeting of foreign investors for corrupt payments on the part of 
public officials in the host countries. Indeed, it could be argued that in corrupt environments, 
FDI firms are the “sitting ducks” for rapacious politicians to extract rents. The regression results 
could reflect identification problems and possible biases.
21 The results themselves need not 
suggest that the association of higher state capture among FDI firms reflects deliberate choices 
on the part of those firms to engage in corruption. However, we reject this hypothesis for a 
number of reasons. First, if FDI firms were subject to discriminatory targeting by rent-seeking 
public officials, then their total bribe payments would be expected to exceed those of domestic 
firms. We find no significant differences in total bribes paid between FDI firms and domestic 
firms, as suggested by the analysis in Tables 3 and 4. Second, FDI firms should have easier exit 
options than domestic firms, preventing them from systematically becoming “sitting ducks” for 
the extraction of bribes. 
 
The third argument against this hypothesis is the most revealing: engaging in state capture is 
associated with substantial benefits for the corrupt FDI firm.
22 To measure firm performance, 
                                                 
21 A potential endogeneity bias arises because the policy environment variable that measures the level of 
corruption in the country of investment is constructed from the same firm level data that measure individual 
propensity to engage in corruption. In fact, with respect to state capture, the extent of state capture measure and 
the individual behavioral measure are constructed from different questions in the BEEPS questionnaire (see 
Appendix 1 for the details) so the endogeneity issue does not arise with these firm level equations. Secondly, 
even in the cases of total bribes paid and public procurement kickbacks in which the cross-country measures are 
constructed as the aggregate of the same question that the micro-level equations are based on, it can be shown 
that cross-country measure is almost orthogonal to the error term in any particular equation, resulting in little 
actual bias. 
22 Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) analyzes the private gains to state capture more broadly. 
Table 6 – Domestic Firms, FDI and Corrupt Behavior 
  Total Bribes Paid  Captor Firms  Kickback Firms 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Size  Small  0.018**  0.018**  0.00  -0.15  0.73**  0.73** 
    (4.56)  (4.55)  (0.01)  (-0.10)  (4.22)  (4.24) 
  Medium  0.007*  0.007*  0.11  0.10  0.58**  0.58** 
    (1.92)  (1.92)  (0.77)  (0.69)  (3.72)  (3.72) 
  (Large)             
               
Origin  De Novo  0.013**  0.013**  0.27**  0.28**  0.71**  0.71** 
    (4.02)  (4.02)  (2.26)  (2.36)  (5.53)  (5.53) 
  Privatized  0.007**  0.007**  0.03  0.04  0.40**  0.40** 
    (2.51)  (2.54)  (0.30)  (0.39)  (3.28)  (3.31) 
  (State)             
               
FDI  FDI Firm  -0.000  -0.002  0.13  -0.23  -0.01  0.11 
    (-0.09)  (-0.43)  (1.30)  (-1.33)  (-0.06)  (0.63) 
  (FDI Firm) x (High 
Corruption) 
  0.003 
(0.52) 
  0.56** 
(2.66) 
  -0.20 
(-0.91) 
               
               
Country    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Dummies               
               
  N  2615  2615  2786  2786  1493  1493 
  Model  OLS  OLS  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit 
  R2 / Pseudo R2  0.11  0.11  0.04  0.05  0.12  0.12 - 14 - 
we use data from the BEEPS survey on real sales growth over the past 3 years.
23 Table 7 
presents uncontrolled means of sales growth for FDI firms in different environments. In all the 
transition countries, FDI firms that engage in state capture, i.e. captor FDI firms, grow at a 
substantially faster pace than other FDI firms. In high capture environments, in particular, 
captor FDI firms, grow at more than twice the rate as other FDI firms. 
 
 
These results can be confirmed in regressions that control for other factors that affect firm 
performance. Table 8 presents the regression results controlling for firm size, sector, origin and 
country fixed effects. The results show that firms with FDI firms generally grow faster than all 
other firms, as do all firms that engage in state capture in high capture countries. But FDI firms 
that engage in state capture get additional gains in terms of sales growth performance above and 
beyond those advantages, as suggested by the positive and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term between FDI and captor firms. Similar results, though not reported, can be 
found for FDI firms that pay public procurement kickbacks. 
 
                                                 
23 Real sales growth is preferable to other potential performance indicators, given the strong incentives for 
misreporting profits in transition countries and wide variation in accounting standards across the region. 
Table 7. State Capture and the Performance of FDI 
Firms 
 
  Real Sales Growth 
(last 3 years) 
All Transition Countries 
Captor firms  53.5 
Other firms  29.4 
Overall  32.1 
 
High Capture Economies 
Captor FDI firms  54.8 
Other FDI firms  20.5 
Overall  24.4 
 
Low Capture Economies 
Captor FDI firms  47.4 
Other FDI firms  36.6 
Overall  40.2 - 15 - 
 
If FDI firms are being targeted by public officials for bribes to influence the content of laws, 
regulations and decrees, they are apparently well compensated for all the attention. Yet the fact 
that FDI firms do not face a higher overall bribe burden than domestic firms, that they enjoy 
substantial private gains as a result of engaging in state capture, and that they can more easily exit 
host markets if they suffered from discriminatory predation suggests that state capture reflects a 
strategic choice by such firms to secure advantages in these markets. Consequently, FDI would 
appear to magnify the risks of state capture in environments where the state is already susceptible 
to such corrupt forms of influence. 
 
Corruption and the Characteristics of FDI Firms 
 
Having investigated the comparison between foreign investors and domestic firms, we examine 
differences among the FDI firms. The group of FDI firms in the BEEPS sample can be divided 
between those with local headquarters – mainly joint ventures with local partners – and those 
with headquarters abroad – mainly establishments of multi-national firms. Differences might be 
expected in the propensity of these types of firms to engage in corruption. Multi-nationals tend 
to have greater resources for ethics training and compliance procedures, more serious 
reputational concerns and somewhat higher risks of detection given their prominence.  In 
Table 8. FDI, State Capture and Firm Performance (OLS Regressions) 
 
Independent Variables  Sub-Category 
(Dummy variable base category in 
parentheses) 
Dependent Variable: 
Real Sales Growth 
(previous 3 years) 
Mining  -3.5 
  (-0.24) 
Services  2.6 
  (0.89) 
Sector 
(Manufacturing)   
De Novo  26.0** 
  (5.79) 
Privatized  0.5* 
  (0.11) 
Origin 
(State owned)   
Small  -24.4** 
  (-4.30) 
Medium  -12.6** 
  (-2.58) 
Size 
(Large)   
FDI Firm  7.2* 
  (1.72) 
   
Interaction with Captor Firm  23.3* 
FDI 
  (1.84) 
Captor Firm  -12.9 
  (-1.14) 
Interaction with   83.0** 
State Capture 
high capture economy  (1.95) 
N = 2685 
R2 = 0.08 
Country dummies included, but not reported 
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses. - 16 - 
contrast, foreign investors often seek out local joint venture partners who “understand how to 
get things done” in their countries and have more extensive personal networks to facilitate 
business. Such differences should affect their propensities to engage in corruption. 
 
As previously, we analyze the uncontrolled results before proceeding to econometric 
specifications. Table 9 presents data on the propensity of FDI firms with local headquarters and 
FDI firms with foreign headquarters to engage in state capture and pay public procurement 
kickbacks, as well as the total bribes paid. For comparison, the last row repeats the results for 
domestic firms from Table 5. 
 
 
Again the data reveal an interesting pattern. FDI firms with local HQ are much more likely to 
engage in state capture than those with foreign HQ, especially in high capture countries. The 
FDI firms with local HQ also pay considerably higher levels of bribes.  Yet they do not 
outperform the multi-national firms on all forms of corruption. FDI firms with foreign HQ are 
more likely to pay procurement kickbacks in dealing with the state in highly corrupt 
environments. Indeed, over 50 per cent of the FDI firms with foreign HQ working in highly 
corrupt countries said they had paid such kickbacks. 
 
These results suggest that foreign investors might choose the type of corruption to engage in on 
the basis of their comparative advantages. “Local” FDI firms with strong contacts in the host 
country’s political and economic decision-making corridors might be better equipped to seek 
advantages through state capture, i.e. through influencing the formation of various laws, rules 
and decrees. FDI firms with foreign HQ would have fewer ties to such structures and might be 
more inclined to focus private payments to those granting specific contracts in working with the 
state. If so, this would again reflect a more strategic approach to corruption on the part of firms 
than has been generally recognized. 
 
We investigate below whether these bivariate relationships continue to hold once we condition 
for all other relevant firm characteristics simultaneously. The results examining the impact of 
firm characteristics on the propensity to engage in state capture, to pay kickbacks and the overall 
bribes paid are presented in Table 10. We examine the propensity of FDI firms with foreign 
Table 9. Characteristics of FDI and Corrupt Behavior 
  Share of Captor Firms1  Share of Kickback Firms2  Total Bribes Paid (as a share 
of annual revenues)3 
    Countries with:    Countries with:    Countries With: 






















9.0  10.4  7.3  25.2  34.0  17.5  3.0  3.8  1.8 
                   
FDI Firms 
Local HQ  12.5  19.9  4.5  28.2  33.3  23.3  3.0  4.8  1.4 
                   
FDI Firms 
Foreign HQ  5.3  6.3  4.9  36.0  53.8  16.7  1.3  1.6  0.9 
Source: BEEPS 
1 - Firms were asked: How often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra unofficial payments to public officials to influence the 
content of new laws, decrees or regulations. The responses ranged across always; usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and never. Those 
responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as engaging in state capture. 
2 – Those firms that traded with the government were asked: How often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra unofficial payments 
to public officials gain government contracts? The responses ranged across always; usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and never. Those 
responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as engaging in public procurement corruption. 
3 – Firms were asked: What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments to public officials? The responses 
ranged across 0%; less than 1%; 1 to 2%; 2-10%; 10 to 12%; 12 to 25%; over 25%. The variable was interpolated at 0%, 1%, 2%, 6%, 11%, 
19% and 25%. - 17 - 
headquarters to engage in different forms of corruption in more highly corrupt countries by 
interacting the FDI dummy variable with the aggregate measures of the different forms of 
corruption at the country level. The regression results confirm that FDI firms with foreign HQ 
do pay less in overall bribes than other FDI firms, but at the same time are more likely to pay 
procurement kickbacks than “local” FDI firms in highly corrupt environments. Differences in 
their propensity to engage in state capture are not significant.  
 
 
Does regulation control the conduct of foreign investors? 
 
The risks posed by the corrupt practices of foreign investors have not escaped the attention of 
policy makers, and in principle many foreign investors are governed by legislation explicitly 
prohibiting corruption. Early unilateral action in this direction was taken by the United States in 
1977, the result of which was the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
24  More recently, 
multilateral negotiations at the OECD resulted in a Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials, signed at the end of 1997. However, little attention has yet been paid to the efficacy of 
                                                 
24 The Act prohibits US firms from using bribes to “maintain or secure business in foreign countries”. 
Table 10 –Characteristics of FDI and Corrupt Behavior  
  Dependent Variables 
  Total Bribes Paid1  Captor Firms2  Kickback Firms3 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Size  Small  0.021**  0.021**  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.09 
    (2.52)  (2.52)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.20) 
  Medium  0.020**  0.020**  0.36  0.35  0.53  0.56 
    (2.85)  (2.80)  (1.07)  (1.04)  (1.31)  (1.39) 
  (Large)             
               
Origin  De Novo  -0.008  -0.009  0.16  0.18  0.80*  0.86* 
    (-0.96)  (-1.03)  (0.40)  (0.45)  (1.65)  (1.77) 
  Privatized  -0.003  -0.004  0.32  0.33  0.00  -0.02 
    (-0.35)  (-0.45)  (0.76)  (0.78)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
  (State)             
               
FDI   -0.021**  -0.014  -0.23  0.07  0.26  -0.83 
  (-3.05)  (-1.31)  (-0.69)  (0.16)  (0.73)  (-1.21) 




x interaction with 
high corruption     (-0.88)    (-0.97)    (2.01) 
               
  (FDI local HQ)             
               
Country    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Dummies               
               
  Model  OLS  OLS  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit 
  N  325  325  318  318  191  191 
  R2 / Pseudo R2  0.27  0.27  0.10  0.11  0.14  0.16 
1. Firms were asked: What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments to public officials? 
The responses ranged across 0%; less than 1%; 1 to 2%; 2-10%; 10 to 12%; 12 to 25%; over 25%. The variable was interpolated 
at 0%, 1%, 2%, 6%, 11%, 19% and 25%. 
2. Firms were asked: How often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra unofficial payments to public officials to 
influence the content of new laws, decrees or regulations. The responses ranged across always; usually; frequently; sometimes; 
seldom and never. Those responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as engaging in state capture. 
3. Those firms that traded with the government were asked: How often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra 
unofficial payments to public officials gain government contracts? The responses ranged across always; usually; frequently; 
sometimes; seldom and never.  Those responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as engaging in public 
procurement corruption. - 18 - 
these measures in achieving their stated objective of reducing corruption.
25 As Table 11 shows
26, 
there appears to be significant variation in the conduct of foreign investors from different 
countries with respect to corruption. These differences might be related to differences in the 
regulatory environments, but if so, those firms from countries with less exacting standards of 
corporate conduct might be responsible for most of the earlier findings that foreign investors 
were engaging in various forms of corruption. This would have significant implications for the 
role and effective governance of FDI in transition economies. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Indeed, the little research that has been directed at the FCPA has simply taken it for granted that US firms are 
constrained in their ability to make corrupt payments and has addressed the question of how this affects the 
level of US FDI and the ability of US firms to compete with other foreign investors. Opponents argued that the 
Act, by effectively raising the cost of overseas business for US firms, would simply undermine their ability to 
compete with firms from other countries (not similarly constrained), with no compensating reduction in 
corruption.  More sympathetic observers argued that the act could represent a useful commitment device to 
avoid bribery if US firms compete primarily with each other, or supply goods for which there is no effective 
substitute. The empirical evidence is mixed. Hines (1995) finds, in a dataset consisting only of aggregate data, 
that the growth rate of US FDI became more sensitive to corruption after 1977, which he interprets as due to the 
FCPA. However, by failing to control for the aversion of all FDI to corruption, this result is hard to interpret. In 
a more systematic study, Wei (1997) finds in a dataset of bilateral investment that the relationship between 
corruption and aggregate FDI is no different for US investors.  In other words, US investors are averse to 
corruption in host countries, but no more so than investors from other countries. 
26 The data in this table is often based on small samples of firms, and as a result the measures are associated 
with a high level of standard error. This data is intended to motivate the investigation of the effect of legislation 
on the conduct of firms, rather than provide definitive evidence on the conduct of investors from particular 
countries. 
Table 11: Corrupt Behavior Among FDI from Different Countries 
Country of Origin*  Total Bribes Paid1 
(% of annual revenues) 
Share of Captor Firms2  Share of Kickback Firms3 
Austria  0.5  15.8  42.9 
Finland  1.8  0  0 
France  3.3  21.1  40.0 
Germany  2.5  11.3  20.6 
Greece  3.8  18.2  60.0 
Italy  5.0  20.0  N/A 
Netherlands  1.0  0  33.3 
Russia  6.1  23.1  37.5 
Sweden  1.3  5.9  40.0 
Switzerland  1.5  8.3  0 
Turkey  3.0  0  N/A 
UK  1.1  0  11.1 
USA  3.6  16.7  42.9 
       
Domestic Firms  3.0  9.0  25.2 
FDI Firms  2.8  11.5  29.2 
Source: BEEPS 
 
* Provided the sample contains more than five firms from that country which reported information on one of the categories of 
corruption (those categories for which this is not the case are recorded as N/A) 
Notes: 
1 – Firms were asked: What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments to public officials? The 
responses ranged across 0%; less than 1%; 1 to 2%; 2-10%; 10 to 12%; 12 to 25%; over 25%. The variable was interpolated at 0%, 1%, 
2%, 6%, 11%, 19% and 25%. 
2 - Firms were asked: How often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra unofficial payments to public officials to influence the 
content of new laws, decrees or regulations. The responses ranged across always; usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and never. 
Those responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as engaging in state capture. 
3 – Those firms that traded with the government were asked: How often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra unofficial 
payments to public officials gain government contracts? The responses ranged across always; usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and 
never. Those responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as engaging in public procurement corruption. - 19 - 
To investigate the impact of anti-corruption legislation more systematically, we define three 
groups of source countries
27 of foreign investment from which firms are in principle 
increasingly
28 constrained by the OECD Convention or the FCPA
29. The unregulated countries 
are those which have no legislation constraining the behavior of their firms in foreign countries. 
Since all OECD members (and 5 non-members) signed the Convention, the unregulated 
countries all come from outside the OECD. A second group consists of both those countries 
that have ratified the OECD Convention and those that have signed, but not yet ratified it at the 
time of the survey (but excluding the US).
30 US firms constitute a separate group since they have 
been subject to the FCPA for many years prior to signing and ratifying the OECD Convention.  
 
To the extent that legislation leads to changes in behavior
31, we would hypothesize that the 
effect is likely to be most strong for the US firms, followed by the OECD convention countries. 
Table 12 examines the conduct of foreign investors and the relationship with anticorruption 
legislation, together with the corresponding results for the whole group of foreign investors and 
the domestic firms for comparison.
 32 Given the smaller sample, we do not divide the countries 
according to the extent of corruption as in previous tables. 
 
The hypothesis that legislation constrains the behavior of foreign investors would be supported 
by evidence showing increasing levels of corruption when reading across table 12 from the 
column depicting the results for US firms under the FCPA to the last column showing the 
results for domestic firms. Yet no such pattern emerges and, in fact, the US investors, a priori 
                                                 
27 See Figure A2 in Appendix 2 for an illustration of the relationship between these categories. 
28 For the few firms in the BEEPS with multiple foreign investors from different countries, the firms were 
classified in the category corresponding to the most constrained of the foreign investors. Thus any firm with a 
US share was grouped with the US firms, any firm with a ratifier, but no US firm was classified as a ratifier, 
and so on. 
29 A fully convincing analysis of the effectiveness of legislation as a policy instrument for reducing corruption 
among foreign investors would require a comparison of behavior before and after the legislative change (After 
controlling for any other time-varying factors that could also be important). However, we utilize instead cross-
sectional variation in anti-corruption legislation among source-countries to identify the impact of this legislation 
on the behavior of foreign investors in the transition economies. It should be borne in mind that as a result of the 
lack of a time dimension in our data our identification is less powerful (In particular we might accept the 
hypothesis that legislation has a significant impact on behavior, when in fact this finding is due to other 
unobserved country characteristics that are correlated with the propensity of firms to engage in corruption.), and 
for this reason the results are preliminary.  
30 The precise rules concerning the coming into force of the Convention can be found at http://www.oecd.org. 
For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the Convention entered into force for the first group of countries on 
February 15
th 1999, and for other countries subsequently as it was ratified domestically. Since the BEEPS was 
implemented during the summer of 1999, we identify only this first group of countries as governed by the 
Convention during the survey. 
31 We treat the existence of legislation governing firms from a particular country as exogenous to the behavior 
foreign investors from that country. More problematic is the fact that the OECD Convention only came into 
force recently for the first group of implementing countries. As a result, since our data were collected in 1999, it 
could be objected that it is simply too soon to detect the ultimate impact it will have. In response we offer two 
arguments. Firstly, although this is undoubtedly true, one would still expect to observe some impact, even if 
significantly less than the eventual maximum.  Secondly, in addition to examining the impact of the OECD 
Convention, we also identify the impact of the FCPA, which has been in force for over twenty years and is 
surely as effective now as it is ever likely to be. 
32 It should be noted that the FCPA and the OECD Convention which was modeled on the FCPA contain an 
exception for “facilitation payments”. Since these payments are very similar to our definition of administrative 
corruption, there is less theoretical reason to suppose that either US Investors or OECD Ratifiers should be 
more constrained with respect to this form of corruption. - 20 - 
the most constrained, do not exhibit lower levels of corruption than either OECD Convention 
countries or the unregulated countries, and in some cases appear to be significantly higher.  
 
 
Table 13 makes these claims more statistically precise, by computing pair wise significance tests 
for the difference between the level of corruption among the various groups.These pair wise 
tests confirm that neither US firms nor firms from the OECD Convention countries exhibit a 
lower propensity than firms from unregulated countries to engage in these common forms of 
corruption, though total bribe payments made firms from OECD Convention countries are 
generally lower. US firms do not exhibit significantly lower levels of corruption, and, based from 
this dataset in some cases, exhibit systematically higher levels. 
 
Table 13. Legislation in the Source Country and Corrupt Behavior (Pair wise 
Comparisons) 
  Total Bribes Paid 
(% of annual revenues) 
Share of Captor 
Firms 
Share of Kickback 
Firms 
Unregulated Countries  4.7**  16.7  31.8 
OECD Convention Countries  2.3  9.8  27.3 
       
Unregulated Countries  4.7  16.7  31.8 
FCPA (US)  3.6  16.7  42.9 
       
OECD Convention Countries  2.3  9.8  27.3 
FCPA (US)  3.6**  16.7  42.9 
Source: BEEPS 
**pair wise t-test significant at 5% level; * pair wise t-test significant at 10% 
 
Tables 14 examines these findings econometrically, controlling simultaneously for other factors 
that determine the propensity to engage in corruption, including firm characteristics and country 
dummies
33 for the location of the investment. We include dummy variables for the regulatory 
variables – (FCPA, OECD Ratification Country, OECD Signatory Country), in which the base 
category includes the unregulated firms and all those not covered by the other dummies. In 
general we find the same pattern of results. Given that two of the dependent variables 
(likelihood to capture and to kickback) are probabilistic, probit specifications were used, while 






                                                 
33 Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria and Lithuania were excluded from the probit analysis since the outcome did not 
vary among foreign investors in these countries and the estimates are not identified. 
Table 12: Legislation in the Source Country and Corrupt Behavior 














Total Bribes Paid  4.7  2.3  3.6  2.8  3.0 
Share of Captor Firms  16.7  9.8  16.7  11.5  9.0 
Share of Kickback Firms  31.8  27.3  42.9  29.2  25.2 
Number of Observations  60  310  63  471  3148 
*excludes US firms           - 21 - 
Table 14: Legislation in the Source Country and Corrupt 
Behavior (Econometric Results) 
  Dependent Variables: 






Size  Small  0.021**  -0.062  -0.07 
    (2.39)  (-0.19)  (-0.18) 
  Medium  0.022**  0.234  0.32 
    (2.82)  (0.81)  (0.86) 
  (Large)       
         
Origin   De Novo  -0.009  0.402  0.77 
    (-0.96)  (1.19)  (1.49) 
  Privatized  -0.004  0.300  -0.02 
    (-0.39)  (0.82)  (-0.04) 
  (State)       
         
FDI   FCPA (US)  0.002  0.207  0.53 
Source    (0.26)  (0.69)  (1.27) 
         
Country  OECD Ratifier  -0.010  -0.107  0.01 
    (-1.32)  (-0.41)  (0.02) 
  OECD Signatory  -0.005  -0.015  0.34 
    (0.50)  (-0.05)  (0.78) 
  (Unregulated)       
Number of observations  299  314  160 
Empirical Model  OLS  Ordered Probit  Ordered Probit 
Pseudo R2  0.27  0.07  0.12 
Country dummies (for country receiving the investment) were included but not 
reported. 





Though the mechanisms by which corruption hinders FDI are by now well known, 
comparatively little is known about the behavior of FDI firms in corrupt environments. The 
results are sobering.  Corruption not only reduces FDI inflows  but attracts lower quality 
investment in terms of governance standards. In misgoverned settings, rather than importing 
higher standards of governance, FDI firms would appear to magnify the problems of state 
capture and procurement kickbacks, while paying a lower overall bribe burden than domestic 
firms. FDI firms undertake forms of corruption that are suited to their comparative advantages, 
as “local” FDI with joint venture partners tend towards state capture, while “multi-national” 
FDI is more likely to rely on more focused procurement kickbacks. It is critical to recognize, 
from a political economy perspective, that these forms of corruption generate substantial gains 
to FDI firms, thereby challenging the premise that these firms are coerced and making it that 
much more difficult to develop effective constraints on such behavior.  
 
Preliminary evidence on transnational legal restrictions to prevent bribery, such as the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the much more recent OECD Convention on Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials, suggests that they have not led to higher standards of corporate 
conduct among foreign investors bound by their provisions. Though it is clearly too early to 
expect results from the OECD Convention, the experience of the FCPA, in effect for over 20 
years, does not appear to be encouraging on the basis of the evidence provided by this sample of - 22 - 
investors in transition economies. This suggests that the OECD Convention will need to focus 
much more attention on effective implementation of its transnational restrictions on bribing 
public officials. 
 
These findings should not be read as a case against foreign investment. Indeed, as we have 
argued elsewhere, state capture is created and maintained through restrictions on competition 
and entry in strategic sectors. Encouraging greater competition in the economy is essential in 
creating a more competitive market for influence, which should place constraints on the ability 
of any small group of actors to capture the state. Our findings confirm that FDI firms can 
contribute to this monopolization of influence through corruption, as much as, if not more so, 
than domestic firms. Efforts to enhance competition by attracting a wider and more diverse set 
of FDI firms is a critical component in broader strategic framework to fight state capture and 
corruption. 
 
Policy measures to tackle corruption among foreign investors must address the powerful 
incentives these firms have to engage in rent-seeking corruption, while providing incentives and 
venues for channeling their legitimate demands to have some influence over public decisions 
that affect them.
34 Transnational restrictions will play a role in establishing norms of behavior 
among foreign investors, but there are strong limitations to their effective implementation. More 
important will be to address the lack of accountability, transparency and competition in the 
domestic market for political influence that enables such forms of corruption.  
                                                 
34 Such activities are accepted as a necessary part of democratic politics in advanced countries and to quote 
Rose-Ackerman (1999), “One can complain about the importance of wealth and large corporations in the 
political life of developed countries, but at least well documented lobbying activities and campaign 
contributions are preferable to secret bribes in maintaining democratic institutions.” - 23 - 
Appendix 1: Measuring Forms of Corruption and Classifying Countries 
 
Methods of measuring and comparing levels of total bribes paid across countries are already 
well-established. The BEEPS survey follows the convention of previous surveys around the 
world which ask firm managers to estimate the proportion of annual revenues typically paid by 
“firms like yours” in unofficial payments to public officials.
35 Table A1 records the average level 
of such payments in each country. 
 
Measuring state capture as a form of corruption distinct from the above is more complex as 
there are few existing indicators in the empirical literature on corruption. One key measurement 
problem is that the extent to which a set of state institutions is captured is not necessarily a 
function of the number of firms that engage in state capture. In an extreme case, a single 
powerful monopoly could generate a much higher level of state capture than a larger number of 
less powerful firms competing to buy off state officials. To compare state capture across firms 
and across countries, we therefore need both to identify the number of firms that engage in it 
and to measure the extent of the impact on all firms from the capture of the state by a subset of 
those firms. Consequently, we use two measures of state capture: 1) an impact measure of the 
extent of the capture economy defined as the share of firms in each country which report a 
direct impact on their business from the purchase of laws, decrees and regulations by firms 
through private payments to public officials, and 2) a behavioral measure that identifies captor 
firms, i.e. those that report having made private payments to public officials for the purpose of 
influencing the contents of laws, decrees or regulations.
36  The impact measure is used to 
construct the cross country index presented in Table A1. The behavioral measure was reported 
is reported in Table 2 above and was used to investigate differences in the propensity to engage 
in state capture at the firm level. 
 
To construct the index of the capture economy, firms were asked to assess the extent to which 
the following six types of activities have had a direct impact on their business:
37 
 
•  the sale of Parliamentary votes on laws to private interests; 
•  the sale of Presidential decrees to private interests; 
                                                 
35 The question was posed in terms of firm revenues rather that profits since estimates of revenues are more 
reliable. In addition the question was posed indirectly in terms of "firms like yours" to reassure respondents that 
their responses would not be attributable directly to their firm. We take total payments as a proxy for 
administrative corruption since evidence from the BEEPS suggests that the majority of bribe payments are for 
this purpose. 
36  Of course, the impact measure of state capture is based on the speculation of firms that other firms are 
engaging in improper behavior and thus less reliable than the behavioral measure. The empirical analysis of the 
effects of state capture on firm-level performance below will be based on the more reliable behavioral measure. 
However, we believe that the impact measure still provides a useful relative indicator of perceptions of the 
impact of state capture across countries. 
37 The decision to include the sale of court decisions to private interests and the mishandling of Central Bank 
funds as elements of state capture requires some explanation. Courts are generally seen as institutions that 
implement existing laws as opposed to making them, though the precedent-setting function of courts can blur 
these boundaries. In the transition countries, where legal systems are still in the nascent stages of development, 
courts can be seen as playing a more formative role in the development of the legal framework. As regards the 
Central Bank, the institution’s role in setting monetary policy and creating the regulatory framework for the 
developing financial system also blurs the distinction between the formation and implementation of rules. While 
recognizing the difficulty of drawing concrete boundaries within any particular institution, we have chosen to 
incorporate these institutions within the category of state capture as a result of the unique nature of the transition 
period. Yet it is important to note that removing these components from the index of state capture does not 
change substantially the ranking of countries on state capture presented in table 2. - 24 - 
•  Central Bank mishandling of funds; 
•  the sale of court decisions in criminal cases; 
•  the sale of court decisions in commercial cases; 
•  illicit contributions paid by private interests to political parties and election campaigns. 
 
The percentage of firms in each country which responded that the respective form of state 
capture has had a significant impact on their business are classified as affected by state capture. 
By averaging across all of the categories an aggregate index of the extent of the capture economy 
is presented in Table A1. 
 
The measure of the extent of public procurement kickbacks is, in the terminology above, a direct 
behavioral measure, based on the assessment of the frequency with which a firm that does 
business with the government is required to make unofficial payments to gain government 
contracts. The index in Table A1 is constructed as the proportion of firms in each country that 
trade with the state and were required to make unofficial payments to win business. 
 
Table A1 also groups the transition economies into 2 categories according to whether the level 
of corruption is high or medium. This is not intended to imply that there are no interesting or 
relevant differences between countries in each group, but only represent the broad tendency. 
These binary measures of the extent of corruption will be used in some of the later sections of 
the paper. - 25 - 
 
 
Table A1 – Measuring the Extent of Corruption in the Transition Economies 
Country  Total Bribes Paid 
(as a % of annual revenue)1
Extent of 
State Capture2 
Extent of Public 
Procurement Corruption3 
Albania  4.0  High  16  Medium  51  High 
Armenia  4.6  High  7  Medium  26  High 
Azerbaijan  5.7  High  41  High  52  High 
Belarus  1.3  Medium  8  Medium  5  Medium 
Bulgaria  2.1  Medium  28  High  13  Medium 
Croatia  1.1  Medium  27  High  26  High 
Czech Republic  2.5  Medium  11  Medium  43  High 
Estonia  1.6  Medium  10  Medium  28  High 
Georgia  4.3  High  24  High  18  Medium 
Hungary  1.7  Medium  7  Medium  15  Medium 
Kazakhstan  3.1  High  12  Medium  21  Medium 
Kyrgyzstan  5.3  High  29  High  19  Medium 
Latvia  1.4  Medium  30  High  22  Medium 
Lithuania  2.8  High  11  Medium  15  Medium 
Moldova  4.0  High  37  High  9  Medium 
Poland  1.6  Medium  12  Medium  32  High 
Romania  3.2  High  21  High  39  High 
Russia  2.8  High  32  High  22  Medium 
Slovakia  2.5  Medium  24  High  35  High 
Slovenia  1.4  Medium  7  Medium  27  High 
Ukraine  4.4  High  32  High  33  High 
Uzbekistan  4.4  High  6  Medium  24  Medium 
             
Overall  3.0    20    26   
Source: Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) based on BEEPS. 
 
Notes: 
1 – Firms were asked: What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments to public 
officials? The responses ranged across 0%; less than 1%; 1 to 2%; 2-10%; 10 to 12%; 12 to 25%; over 25%. The variable was 
interpolated at 0%, 1%, 2%, 6%, 11%, 19% and 25%. 
2 - Firms were asked whether state capture in each of the following dimensions (parliamentary legislation, presidential 
decrees, central bank, criminal courts, commercial courts, political parties) had no impact; minor impact; significant impact or 
very significant impact on their business. Those firms that reported a significant or very significant impact were classified as 
affected by state capture in that dimension. The state capture index is calculated at the unweighted average of the proportion of 
firms in each country affected by each of the six components of state capture. 
3 – Those firms that traded with the government were asked: how often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra 
unofficial payments to public officials gain government contracts? The responses ranged across always; usually; frequently; 
sometimes; seldom and never. Those responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as engaging in public 
procurement corruption. - 26 - 
 
Appendix 3 – The BEEPS data by the legislative status of the source country 
 
Table A2 summarizes the BEEPS sample of foreign investors. For completeness the table lists 
all the signatory countries, whether or not the BEEPS sampled foreign investors from these 
countries, together with the number of data points in the BEEPS from each country
38. The 
signatories are further classified as OECD Member countries and according to their ratification 
status at the time of the collection of the BEEPS data.
39  
                                                 
38 This consists of all 29 OECD member countries together with Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and the 
Slovak Republic.  The BEEPS contains firms from all 34 Signatory countries except Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Chile, Luxembourg, Mexico and New Zealand. 






Table A2 – Signatories of the OECD Convention and the BEEPS sample 
Country  OECD Member  Ratification of Convention  Firms in the BEEPS† 
Argentina  No  No  0 
Australia  Yes  No  0 
Austria  Yes  No  22 
Belgium  Yes  No  5 
Brazil  No  No  0 
Bulgaria  No  Yes  1 
Canada  Yes  Yes  2 
Chile  No  No  0 
Czech Republic  Yes  No  8 
Denmark  Yes  No  4 
Finland  Yes  Yes  15 
France  Yes  No  21 
Germany  Yes  Yes  87 
Greece  Yes  Yes  13 
Hungary  Yes  Yes  1 
Iceland  Yes  Yes  1 
Ireland  Yes  No  6 
Italy  Yes  No  13 
Japan  Yes  Yes  5 
Korea  Yes  Yes  1 
Luxembourg  Yes  No  0 
Mexico  Yes  No  0 
Netherlands  Yes  No  19 
New Zealand  Yes  No  0 
Norway  Yes  Yes  4 
Poland  Yes  No  5 
Portugal  Yes  No  0 
Slovak Republic  No  No  1 
Spain  Yes  No  1 
Sweden  Yes  No  20 
Switzerland  Yes  No  13 
Turkey  Yes  No  12 
UK  Yes  Yes  30 
USA  Yes  Yes  63 
       
Ratification Country  Yes  Yes  150 
Signatory Country  Yes/No  No  223 
Unregulated Country  No  No  60 
       
Source: OECD, United States Department of State  
†The country of origin was not identified for 38 firms and these are not included. - 28 - 
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